

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 30088 231038Z

51

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 AID-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 CPR-02 AF-10

EB-11 COME-00 INT-08 SCEM-02 SCI-06 DRC-01 /209 W

----- 063631

R 231000Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4953

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSYKABUL

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 30088

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, IR, A

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR-DESIGATE TO THE US

1. SUMMARY: AT SMALL LUNCHEON I HOSTED NOVEMBER 19
DEPARTING PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR SAHIBZADA YAKUB KHAN (WHO HAS
BEEN DESIGNATED AMBSSADOR TO US) EXPRESSED VIEWS ON: HIS
TRAVEL PLANS, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, PAKISTANI MILITARY
TRAINING FOR ARABS: PROBLEMS WITH AFGHANISTAN (PUSHTUNISTAN);
AND IRAN. END SUMMAY.

2. TRAVEL PLANS: AMB. AYKUB SAID HE WOULD BE DEPARTING PARIS
ABOUT DECEMBER 10 TO SPEND A FEW DAYS IN ENGLAND. HE EXPECTED
TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS. HE ALLOWED
HUMOROUSLY THAT THE PLANS WOULD CHANGE IF AGREEMENT WERE REFUSED,
BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN ASSURED AGREEMENT WOULD BE GRANTED
SHORTLY AFTER THE SECRETARY'S RETURN TO THE US.

3. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLIT: AMB. YAKUB SAID HIS GOVERNMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 30088 231038Z

HAD GREATLY APPRECIATED THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN ON

HIS WAY TO PEKING. THE SECRETARY'S BRIEFING HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL, AND THEY WERE GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY HIS SUCCESS IN GETTING EGYPTIANS TO AGREE TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS EVEN BEFORE ALL PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED BY ISRAEL. MAINTENANCE OF THE HARD ARAB LINE WOULD HAVE BLOCKED PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. HE THOUGHT ISRAELIS NOW REALIZED THAT NEXT WAR WOULD BE ONE OF ATTRITION WHICH THEY COULD NOT WIN AND HENCE THEY ALSO WERE PREPARED FOR A SETTLEMENT. AS A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MAN, HE COULD SEE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN ON THE VERGE OF A "CLASSIC" VICTORY AT THE TIME OF THE CEASEFIRE. ISRAELI AWARENESS THAT SUCH A VICTORY WOULD HAVE DIMINISHED CHANCES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WAS ENCOURAGING. YAKUB SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY COUNSELED MODERATION TO THE ARAB BELLIGERENTS, BUT ALSO ADVISED THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES TO AVOID OVERUSING THE OIL BOYCOTT. IF THE POWER OF THEIR CONTROL OVER OIL WERE USED EXCESSIVELY, IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. OVERALL, YAKUB THOUGHT THAT WHILE THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATION EFFORTS WAS FAR FROM CERTAIN, THE SITUATION WAS MORE PROMISING THAN IT HAD BEEN IN YEARS. HIS GOVERNMENT, WHOSE ADVICE WAS LISTENED TO WITH RESPECT BY THE ARAB COUNTRIES, WOULD CONTINUE TO COUNSEL MODERATION AND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

4. PAKISTANI MILITARY TRAINING FOR ARABS: YAKUB SAID THE PAKISTANI WERE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE OF MILITARY TRAINERS, PARTICULARLY IN AVIATION, FOR SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES. BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY ADVISORY ROLE, THEY WERE OFTEN ASKED FOR THEIR OPINION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THEY THOUGHT THEREFORE THEY HAD BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN SOME OF THE ARAB DECISIONS TO PURCHASE THE MIRAGE AIRCRAFT. IN GENERAL, THEY RECOMMENDED THE EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY HAD FOUND EFFECTIVE -- BUT ALSO THE ARABS HAD TO BE AWARE, AS WERE THE PAKISTANIS, OF THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING FOLLOW-ON AND REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS. FRANCE HAD PROVEN TO BE A RELIABLE PROVIDER.

5. AFGHANISAN (PUSHTUNISTAN): PAKISTAN IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE RECENT CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. DAUD HAS LONG BEEN INTERESTED IN PUSHTUNISTAN AND HENCE PUSHES A POLICY WHICH CONFLICTS WITH PAKISTAN'S INTEREST. DAUD HAS BEEN ALSO CLOSE TO THE USSR. HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANIS ARE EVEN MORE CONCERNED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 30088 231038Z

ABOUT THE NEW YOUNG OFFICER CORPS WHICH IS CLEARLY STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE SOVIETS WHO TRAINED THEM. BETTER THE EVIL ONE KNOWS (DAUD), THAN THE EVIL ONE DOES NOT (THE YOUNG OFFICERS), YAKUB COMMENTED. EVEN IF THE USSR HAD NOT BEEN BEHIND THE RECENT COU, THE PAKISTANI ARE CONVINCED THAT THE USSR KNEW ABOUT IT IN ADVANCE, FAVORED IT, AND WILL EXPLOIT IT. IF THE AFGHAN EFFORT TO DETACH PUSHTUNISTAN AND BELUCHISTAN FROM PAKISTAN -- AND IRAN -- WORKS, IT WOULD MEAN THE END OF

PAKISTAN AND WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE FUTURE OF IRAN WHICH DEPENDS SO MUCH ON THE LIFE OF ONEMAN. IT WOULD PERMIT THE PENETRATION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE DOWN TO THE INDIAN OCEAN. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE RIDICULOUS TO DESCRIBE INDIA AS A SATELLITE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INDI DID NOT SEEM CONCERNED A ABOUT THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. HENCE, PAKISTAN THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA.

6. IRAN: IRAN IS PERHAPS PAKISTA'S CLOSEST FRIEND AMONG THE FOREIGN NATIONS. IT SEEMS MANY PROBLEMS THE WAY PAKISTAN DOES, BUT IT VIEWS THE AFGHANISTAN/PUSHTUNISTAN PROBLEM WITH LESS OF A SENSE OF URGENCY. YAKUB THOUGHT GOI MIGHT FEEL A GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY IF IT APPEARED THE USSR WAS EXERTING PRESSURE TO THE EAST AND WEST OF IRAN, INCLUDING THE BELUCHI INHABITED AREAS N BOTH SIDES OF IRAN'S WESTERN BORDER.

7. COMMENT: DURING AMB. YAKUB'S ASSIGNMENT TO PARIS WE HAVE FOUND HIM INTELLIGENT, FORTHRIGHT, AND AUTHORITATIVE WE HAVE THE SAME HIGH OPINION OF HIS ABILITIES AS AN AMBASSADOR THAT EMBASSY ISLAMABAD REPORTED BASED ON HIS MILITARY CAREER (BIOGRAPHIC REPORT OF MARCH 31, 1972). OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUES IN THE QUAI SAY THAT HE WILL BE GREATLY MISSED. HE WAS FOUND TO BE INTELLIGENT, ENERGETIC, COURTEOUS, AND CULTURED. HE WAS NOT ONLY FLUENT BUT ALSO ELOQENT IN FRENCH. THEY FOUND THAT HE HAD GOOD CONNECTIONS WITHIN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT AND WAS WELL INFORMED ABOUT EVENTS AT HOME WHICH AUGMENTED HIS EFFECTIVENESS. THE FRENCH CONSIDER THAT HE ACQUITTED HIS TASK WITH GREAT DISTINCTION AND GIVE HIM THE ACCOLADE OF VERY SUPERIOUR AMBASSADOR. WE BELIEVE THAT AS AMBASSADOR TOUS YAKUB WILL MAKE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TOUS-PAKISTANI RELATIONS. IRWIN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973PARIS30088
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731116/aaaaalrw.tel
Line Count: 145
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22-Aug-2001 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <26-Nov-2001 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: VIEWS OF PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR-DESIGATE TO THE US
TAGS: PFOR, PK, IR, US, (KHAN, SAHIBZADA YAKUB)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005